Over the past five years, North Korea has faced a perfect storm of isolation — severe international sanctions, closed borders during the pandemic, natural disasters, and systemic mismanagement. The result has been a contraction of official economic activity, skyrocketing prices, and widespread shortages of food, medicine, and fuel.
Yet despite these conditions, the regime in Pyongyang has shown remarkable resilience. Its state-controlled propaganda remains intact. The black-market economy, or jangmadang, is growing. And leader Kim Jong-un continues to project stability, even as hardship deepens across the country.
“The state economy is breaking down, but society is not,” said Dr. Rachel Min, a North Korea scholar at the University of Tokyo. “People are adapting in decentralized, often informal ways. What looks like collapse from the outside may in fact be a reconfiguration.”
North Koreans increasingly rely on underground markets, private farming plots, bartering, and smuggling to get by. These unofficial systems have evolved into complex, semi-permanent structures that operate beyond state control, challenging the government’s ideological grip.
Still, the signs of stress are undeniable. Malnutrition is rising, public infrastructure is crumbling, and reports from recent defectors describe power outages lasting days, hospitals without basic supplies, and rising discontent among mid-level party members.
“Collapse is not a single event — it’s a process,” said former South Korean intelligence official Lee Joon-hyuk. “What we’re witnessing is a state losing functional control in large parts of the country, even as it maintains symbolic authority.”
The regime’s response has been twofold: intensify repression and promote self-reliance. Pyongyang has doubled down on slogans urging citizens to “tighten belts” and “endure hardship,” while launching new loyalty campaigns and purges of suspected dissenters. At the same time, military spending and weapons development continue unabated, signaling that the leadership still prioritizes strategic deterrence over economic reform.
China, North Korea’s primary trade partner, has resumed limited border trade, but it remains far below pre-pandemic levels. Humanitarian aid is sporadic, as North Korea continues to reject most foreign assistance and limits outside monitoring.
International experts warn that if current trends persist, North Korea could face a humanitarian disaster not unlike the famine of the 1990s. But others suggest the regime may yet find ways to sustain itself, not through growth, but through controlled stagnation and increased reliance on informal economic networks.
“In some ways, North Korea is becoming a hybrid state — officially socialist, but unofficially dependent on market activity it doesn’t fully acknowledge or control,” said Andrei Lankov, a longtime Korea specialist.
For now, the question remains open: is North Korea collapsing from within, or merely adapting to survive in ways the outside world has yet to fully understand?